ABSTRACT A more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy and a more bureaucratic policy-making process have increased the opportunities for China's civilian research institutes to affect foreign policy. Beijing's growing involvement in the international community has created increased demand for research and analysis to aid Chinese leaders in making informed decisions. A more pluralistic and competitive policy environment has given analysts at think tanks more influence, but has also created new competition from analysts and authors working outside the traditional research institute system. This article examines the evolving role of Chinese civilian foreign policy research institutes, their relationships to policy makers, and the pathways through which they provide input into Chinese foreign policy formulation. It provides an overview of the key civilian research institutes, identifies important trends affecting them, and examines the roles and functions they play. The article concludes with an assessment of sources of policy influence within the Chinese foreign policy process.
The advent of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up policy in the late 1970s marked the beginning of a gradual transformation of China's regional and global role from a passive ideological observer to that of an active, more pragmatic, participant. Beijing's increased involvement in the international community created demand for in-depth research and analysis to aid Chinese leaders in making informed foreign policy and national security decisions. China's participation in a growing variety of international organizations and institutions also produced the need for specialized expertise in esoteric fields such as arms control, international trade, climate change and intellectual property.' A complex network of national security research institutions was already in place to respond to the new requirements of a more international role. A few of these institutes traced their origins to Yan'an in the late 1930s, others were created in the 1950s and 1960s and temporarily shut down during the Cultural Revolution, and some had been established in the post-Mao era. policy formulation.5 It begins with an overview of the key civilian foreign policy research institutes. Next, it identifies some of the important trends under way in the community of Chinese civilian foreign policy research institutions, and examines the roles and functions of these institutes. Finally, the article identifies pathways used by analysts in Chinese think tanks to influence foreign policy decision-making, and assesses the sources of policy influence.6 
Trends in China's Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institute Community
Over the past two decades, the number of Chinese research institutes has grown and their role in the Chinese policy-making process has become more important. Several significant trends are reshaping the composition of these research institutes and the way they operate within the Chinese foreign policy making system. Development of horizontal linkages. China's system is still "stovepiped" into vertical hierarchies or systems and research products are transferred upward, not downward. Nevertheless horizontal relationships and mechanisms have flourished in the past decade. Seminars and conferences often bring together experts from various research institutes to discuss a particular subject or an important international event. Such meetings frequently precede or follow international visits by senior Chinese leaders and discuss specific agenda items as well as the broader bilateral and global context of the visit. A brief report on these discussions that includes policy recommendations is sometimes forwarded to the leadership via a leader's personal secretary or through the Central Committee's Office of Foreign Affairs. Most conferences are not reported in the Chinese press, unless they are organized by Chinese propaganda organs. One such meeting was co-sponsored by Liberation Daily and the China International Relations Association following Premier Zhu Rongji's failed effort to reach an agreement with President Clinton on the terms of China's entry into the World Trade Organization during an April 1999 visit to the United States.8 8. "Premier Zhu's visit to US has strategic meaning," Jiefang ribao, 13 April 1999. The article noted that the 13 April seminar included "experts and scholars from different institutions located in Shanghai" who "exchanged their views on the background, meaning and other issues related to PRC Premier Zhu Rongji's visit to the US."
The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in April 1999 was followed by numerous seminars that assembled Chinese researchers to discuss the significance of the bombing for Sino-American relations, American foreign policy, the future of war and peace, and the overall international situation. Better educated, better informed. Chinese researchers in foreign policy institutes are on the whole more highly-educated than they were a decade or so ago. Most institute researchers have advanced degrees and a growing number have PhDs, many from Western universities. Many institute experts are skilled in foreign languages. The internet has provided increased access to information, which to some extent has eroded the advantages previously held by resource-rich institutes such as CICIR. Expanded topics of research. Chinese research institutes analyse a wide range of regional and global issues. Many institutes produce annual reports that survey global trends and developments in specific regions. During the reform era, the research agenda of these institutes has broadened to encompass issues such as north-south economic relations, globalization, terrorism, and regional economic and security co-operation. Institutes with global responsibilities were traditionally divided along regional lines with research sections for North America, the Soviet Union/Russia and Eastern Europe, South and South-East Asia, the Middle East and so on. Institutes with a country or regional focus were primarily organized into divisions that studied external and internal policies, with the latter divided into, for example, domestic politics, social issues, culture and literature. In recent years, however, many Chinese institutes have been reorganized to allow for study of transnational issues. CICIR now has a division of world economics and a division of arms control studies which includes a sub-group that analyses drug trafficking and international crime. Just months prior to the 11 September terrorist attacks, CICIR established a new Centre for Counter-Terrorism Studies. The CASS Institute of American Studies also recently created a centre for arms control research.
Increasing role of university professors and institutes. In the past few years, full-time university professors have been participating more frequently in policy discussions that bring together experts from different research units. Some professors at major universities in Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen are being tasked to provide analysis to policy makers. The MFA sometimes commissions papers from professors whom they judge to have greater expertise in a subject area than researchers at CIIS, its own research arm. One foreign ministry official noted that his department had a few trusted professors who could be asked to conduct policy research to supplement work done within the ministry. His department preferred to approach university experts for specific research rather than task generalists at the research institutes affiliated with the foreign ministry. Many Chinese analysts expect the role of university professors and university research institutes to continue to grow in the coming years. At present, however, university input to the policy-making process remains infrequent and sporadic.
Key Roles and Functions of Foreign Policy Research Institutes
In the past decade or so, the functions performed by Chinese civilian foreign policy research institutes have evolved. The five main roles played by these institutes today are outlined below.
Provide information, analysis and advice to the leadership. The primary function of the major civilian foreign policy research institutes is to provide reports to senior policy makers and leaders. Institutes or individual specialists are commissioned to write studies and provide recommendations on policy matters. Some give oral briefings to leaders on specific issues. Scholars increasingly take the initiative to propose conducting research on subject areas they judge to be important for Chinese policy makers. Some institutes are routinely tasked to support the foreign activities of the Chinese leadership. For example, CICIR is assigned to provide preparatory and background information for the foreign travel of all the Politburo Standing Committee members. In addition to supplying biographical information on foreign leaders, CICIR provides policy analyses and recommendations. It is the only institute known to provide a daily foreign intelligence brief to the Chinese leadership. It is usually one to two pages in length and contains an analysis of the single most important global event of the day. Positional influence can be based either on an organizational relationship with particular policy-making bodies or on access to classified information through institutional channels. Classified information is strictly controlled within the Chinese system. CICIR is unique among civilian research institutes in having a special documents room where researchers with a "need to know" can access Party, government and even many PLA documents. CICIR and CIIS analysts regularly read diplomatic cables, presidential letters, reports on summit meetings and other classified materials that university professors and analysts at other civilian think tanks do not.
Conduct academic research. There is great variation from one institute
In the US intelligence system, analysts from the CIA or DIA carry more weight in inter-agency meetings because of their agency's reputation and institutional position in the intelligence community. Some Chinese research institutes have similar weight within the Chinese policymaking process. For example, CICIR plays an analytical role roughly equivalent to the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. Its size (roughly 300 researchers), access to classified intelligence, reputation and location under the Ministry of State Security mean that CICIR's analytical reports regularly reach the desks of policy makers. Regulations stipulate which research units can use certain channels to submit papers to the leadership. Only specified institutes have the right to send papers to the secretaries of senior leaders, to the Central Committee General Office, and to the Central Committee Foreign Affairs Office. CICIR is permitted to use all of these access channels. Although reports written by CICIR analysts regularly reach policy makers, their influence depends on the importance and relevance of the topic and whether staff members flag a report for a policy maker's attention. The annual reports produced by many Chinese research institutes each December also illustrate positional influence. The reports are intended to be a definitive assessment of key issues, bilateral relationships and the international situation, but the weight accorded to each report depends on which institute produces them.
A different kind of positional influence flows from being located within the same xitong as a policy-making organization. For example, the CIIS and the Institute for International Studies, a smaller analytical unit at the Foreign Affairs College, have an organizational relationship within the foreign ministry system that gives them a degree of access and policy influence. Both are sometimes directly tasked by the foreign ministry to produce reports on particular subjects, which are presumably read by the policy makers who request them. Belonging to the foreign ministry xitong also creates the possibility of more direct policy influence. CIIS sometimes sends staff members to serve as diplomats in Chinese embassies overseas. The opportunity to serve in a relatively senior position in the foreign ministry gives these CIIS analysts a direct policy role, along with the opportunity to make personal contacts within the foreign ministry that may yield future influence.
Because positional influence stems from a research institute's formal position within the government, it tends to endure despite fluctuations in personnel. Regular channels to policy makers, access to classified information and institutional relationships make research institutes such as CICIR and CIIS more influential than think tanks that lack these assets. Although most academic books and articles are unlikely to reach policy makers, they can sometimes push the boundaries of policy debate, as when Shi Yinhong, a professor at People's University, proposed that China should take the lead in establishing a collective security system in East Asia, even if such a security system would require Beijing to restrict the use of force against Taiwan.22 Shi's article prompted debate and scholarly discussion on a previously taboo subject. Scholarly articles in major journals have the potential to exert indirect influence and help analysts build their reputation. Serious books can sometimes influence policy makers, especially if they are read and praised by a senior leader. Jiang Zemin enjoys reading policy-relevant books, and reportedly Experiential influence. Study abroad, living abroad, or contacts and information gained from foreign travel can also be a source of potential policy influence. As the Chinese foreign policy system becomes more professionalized, university degrees, foreign travel or study, and personal connections with foreign experts are becoming increasingly important credentials. Think tank analysts who study abroad as visiting fellows or who travel abroad for conferences or training programmes informally convey their conclusions to officials or write reports summarizing their experiences for the senior leaders at their think tanks. Some of these reports receive wider circulation among a policy audience. Travel or study abroad often gives Chinese analysts new perspectives on the countries they visit and the policy issues they analyse, giving their reports more credibility. This is especially true if analysts are able to gain access to senior US policy makers or prominent scholars. Regardless of whether the information gained from interviews is useful (or even accurate), the 27. Since Shanghai-based analysts tend to be more liberal-minded than their Beijing-based counterparts, increased Shanghai policy influence could have a significant impact on Chinese policy towards Taiwan. The China Quarterly ability to cite authoritative foreign sources adds credibility to the analytical product.
Those Chinese analysts who began their careers in the foreign ministry before switching to positions at research institutes have a different kind of experiential influence. Their diplomatic experience gives their reports more credibility, while their personal connections can ensure that their advice and written reports reach policy makers. There are numerous examples of this phenomenon, notably at CIIS. The fact that many PRC America-watchers have lived or studied in the United States increases the credibility of their analysis of US policy (though it can also cause these analysts to be mistrusted).
Assessing Influence
Despite the sweeping changes affecting the foreign policy research institute system, positional influence remains important. Access to classified information, direct reporting channels to policy makers, and organizational ties to leaders and policy makers give think tanks such as CICIR and CIIS regular opportunities to influence policy. At the same time, the Chinese foreign policy system is much more open than in the past. Analysts with policy expertise, national reputations or personal connections with policy makers can exercise policy influence even when working outside traditionally influential research institutes. China's more pluralistic and competitive policy environment means that senior leaders and policy makers now receive information and analysis from a range of actors. Some policy makers actively solicit analysis that addresses current policy issues or supports their views. As a result, analysts at Chinese research institutes have more opportunity to influence foreign policy than ever before.
Examining the pathways Chinese analysts can use to reach policy makers and how they rate in terms of the four sources of policy influence discussed above can help evaluate the significance of an individual analyst's writings and assess their relative importance. Some analysts have only indirect pathways and rely on a single source of influence. Others have multiple direct pathways and have several potential sources of policy influence. These analysts are more likely to be able to reach policy makers with their opinions, and to have policy makers pay attention. The information requirements for a proper assessment of potential influence can be high. At the most basic level, it is necessary to know which think tanks are affiliated with which policy organizations.29 More specific biographical or organizational information is also needed to place articles into context and to determine which analysts are influential and which are not. Scholars need to know about personal links between analysts and key policy makers (which might include similar educational experiences, home towns or home provinces, work experiences, or institutional ties). Gathering this kind of information can be labour intensive, Interactions with analysts in Chinese research institutes can be a useful source of information, but need to be treated with caution. The settings in which Chinese analysts interact with scholars often structure the types of exchanges that are possible and should be considered in evaluating their comments. In general, more formal or higher-level settings (especially when Chinese government officials are present) are more likely to produce efforts to send particular policy messages and are useful for determining the nuances of Chinese policy. Informal or private meetings often give a better sense of what Chinese analysts are really thinking. They are also useful for learning about current policy debates and getting a sense of the range of Chinese views on different issues. In public settings, analysts usually base their comments on their understanding of China's official policies or official statements, but may feel free to offer their own understandings or interpretations. Willingness to deviate from official positions frequently depends on the sensitivity of the issue and whether more senior Chinese officials or experts are present. In these cases, junior analysts will stick more closely to the Party line and express agreement with the views of the seniors rather than offering their own opinions. This sometimes reflects concerns about how dissenting views will be interpreted. Such sensitivity to the setting reflects both a cultural tendency to defer to authority in public settings and a sense of Party discipline that can sometimes be relaxed in private settings.
This article has focused on pathways and sources of influence, but it is important to remember that the context of a policy decision often affects an analyst's potential influence. A key forthcoming bilateral or multilateral meeting can make policy makers more receptive to input from think tank analysts. For example, America specialists used the period before Jiang Zemin's 1997 summit meeting with President Clinton to articulate the potential basis for a constructive strategic partnership with the United States. The desire for a successful summit made Chinese leaders more receptive to these arguments. Conversely, periods of leadership conflict or crisis situations can make analysts reluctant to put controversial analysis forward in a nationalistic policy environment. Many America specialists were cautious in their writings following the embassy bombing to avoid accusations of being too soft on the United States. However, analysts who favoured a tougher line viewed the period following the bombing as an opportunity to push for a firmer Chinese policy. Attention to these contextual factors is important in evaluating the content of 
Conclusion
China's deepening involvement with the outside world in the reform era has increased the need for specialized analysis to guide the formulation of Chinese foreign and national security policy. As Chinese senior leaders and officials grapple with a range of complicated foreign policy issues, they have become more willing to turn to research institutes and universities for assistance. Analysts at research institutes routinely provide information, advice and analysis that helps China's senior leaders and policy makers interpret an increasingly complex external world. A more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy and a more bureaucratic policymaking process have increased the opportunities for research institutes to affect foreign policy. The emergence of a more pluralistic and competitive Chinese policy environment has increased the potential influence of analysts at Chinese international relations think-tanks, but has also created new competition from analysts and authors working outside the traditional research institute system. Understanding the sources of policy influence and the pathways through which influence is exercised is important to help identify which analysts and think tanks are most influential and where their influence is felt within the Chinese system. Some research institutes such as CICIR and CIIS continue to exercise influence through traditional pathways, while analysts at universities and less well-connected think tanks must rely on personal connections and other means to reach policy makers. Study of the evolution of the Chinese foreign policy and national security decision-making process must include an evaluation of the changing role played by Chinese research institutes and analysts. This special section of The China Quarterly provides a starting point, but more work remains to be done. Students of Chinese foreign policy should continue to document and classify examples of policy influence in order to improve our understanding of how analysts at research institutes affect Chinese foreign policy.
